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Abstract. This paper presents various methods for estimating the size of the shadow 
economy and analyzes their strengths and weaknesses. The purpose of the paper is twofold. 
Firstly, it demonstrates that no ideal method exists to estimate the size and development of 
the shadow economy. Because of its flexibility, the MIMIC method used to get macro-
estimates of the size of the shadow economy is discussed in greater detail. Secondly, the 
paper focuses on the definition and causal factors of the shadow economy and provides a 
comparison of the size of the shadow economy using different estimation methods. 
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1. Introduction 
ssets Empirical research about the size and development of the shadow 
economy all over the world has grown rapidly. Nowadays, there are so 
many studies
1)
, which use different methods in order to estimate the size 
and development of the shadow economy, that it is quite difficult to judge the 
reliability of various methods. Hence, the goal of this paper is to critically review 
the various methods for estimating the size of the shadow economy and to discuss 
their strengths and weaknesses
2
. This will enable an interested reader to appreciate 
the advantages and disadvantages of the different methods. 
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section some theoretical 
considerations are presented, starting with a definition of the shadow economy and 
a brief discussion of its main causes. In section 3 the various measurement 
methods, as well as their strengths and weaknesses, are described. This section also 
presents estimates of the size of the shadow economy in Germany using different 
estimation methods. Finally, section 4 presents a summary and some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
2.1. Defining the shadow economy 
Researchers attempting to measure the size of shadow economy face the 
question of how to define it.
3 )
 One commonly used working definition is all 
currently unregistered economic activities that would contribute to the officially 
calculated (or observed) Gross National Product if observed.
4)
 Smith (1994, p. 18) 
uses the definition “market-based production of goods and services, whether legal 
 
a† Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University of Linz Altenbergerstrasse 69 A-4040 Linz 
Austria. 
. +43-732-2468-8210 
. friedrich.schneider@jku.at 
A 
Turkish Economic Review 
 TER, 3(2), F. Schneider, p.256-280. 
257 
257 
or illegal, that escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP.”  One of the 
broadest definitions includes “those economic activities and the income derived 
from them that circumvent government regulation, taxation or observation”.5) As 
these definitions still leave a lot of questions unanswered, table 1 offers a 
reasonable consensus for a definition of the underground (or shadow) economy.  
From table 1, it is clear that a broad definition of the shadow economy includes 
unreported income from the production of legal goods and services – either from 
monetary or barter transactions – and so includes all economic activities that would 
generally be taxable were they reported to the tax authorities.  
 
Table 1. A taxonomy of types of underground economic activities 
Type of activity Monetary transactions Non-monetary transactions 
 
Illegal Activities 
 
Trade with stolen goods; drug dealing 
and manufacturing; prostitution; 
gambling; smuggling; fraud; etc.  
 
Barter of drugs, stolen goods, 
smuggling etc. Producing or growing 
drugs for own use. Theft for own use. 
 
 
 
Tax Evasion 
 
Tax Avoidance 
 
Tax Evasion 
 
Tax Avoidance 
 
Legal Activities 
Unreported income 
from self-
employment; 
Wages, salaries and 
assets from 
unreported work 
related to legal 
services and goods 
Employee 
discounts, fringe 
benefits 
Barter of legal 
services and 
goods 
All do-it-yourself 
work and 
neighbor help 
 
Structure of the table is taken from Lippert & Walker (1997, p. 5) with 
additional remarks provided 
This paper uses the following, narrower, definition of the shadow economy.
6)
 
The shadow economy includes all market-based legal production of goods and 
services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following 
reasons:  
(1) to avoid payment of taxes, e.g. income taxes or value added taxes, 
(2) to avoid payment of social security contributions, 
(3) to avoid certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, 
maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and 
(4) to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing 
statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms. 
2.2. Theorizing about the shadow economy 
A useful starting point for a theoretical discussion of the shadow economy is the 
ground-breaking study by Allingham & Sandmo (1972) on income tax evasion. 
While the shadow economy and tax evasion are not congruent, in most cases 
activities in the shadow economy imply the evasion of direct or indirect taxes, such 
that factors determining tax evasion will most certainly also affect the shadow 
economy. According to Allingham and Sandmo tax compliance depends on its 
expected costs and benefits. The benefits of tax non-compliance result from the 
individual marginal tax rate and true individual income. In the case of the shadow 
economy the individual marginal tax rate is often roughly calculated using the 
overall tax burden from indirect and direct taxes including social security 
contributions. The expected costs of non-compliance derive from deterrence 
enacted by the state, that is, the state’s auditing activities raising the probability of 
detection and the fines individuals face when they are caught. Individual morality 
also plays a role in compliance and additional costs may apply beyond the tax 
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administration’s pure punishment in the form of psychic costs like shame or regret, 
but also additional pecuniary costs if, for example, loss of reputation results.  
Individuals are rational calculators who weigh up costs and benefits when 
considering breaking the law. Their decision to partially or completely participate 
in the shadow economy is a choice under uncertainty, facing a trade-off between 
gains if their activities are not discovered and losses if discovered and penalized. 
Shadow economic activities SE thus negatively depend on the probability of 
detection p and potential fines f, and positively on the opportunity costs of 
remaining formal denoted as B. The opportunity costs are positively determined by 
the burden of taxation T and high labor costs W –individual income generated in 
the shadow economy is usually categorized as labor income rather than capital 
income – due to labor market regulations. Hence, the higher the tax burden and 
labor costs, the more incentives individuals have to avoid these costs by working in 
the shadow economy. The probability of detection p itself depends on enforcement 
actions A taken by the tax authority and on facilitating activities F accomplished by 
individuals to reduce detection of shadow economic activities. This discussion 
suggests the following structural equation:  
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Hence, shadow economic activities may be defined as those economic activities 
and income earned that circumvent government regulation, taxation or observation. 
More narrowly, the shadow economy includes monetary and non-monetary 
transactions of a legal nature; hence all productive economic activities that would 
generally be taxable were they reported to the state (tax) authorities. Such activities 
are deliberately concealed from public authorities to avoid payment of income, 
value added or other taxes and social security contributions, or to avoid compliance 
with certain legal labor market standards such as minimum wages, maximum 
working hours, or safety standards and administrative procedures. The shadow 
economy thus focuses on productive economic activities that would normally be 
included in the national accounts but which remain underground due to tax or 
regulatory burdens.
7)
 Although such legal activities would contribute to a country’s 
value added, they are not captured in national accounts because they are produced 
in illicit ways. Informal household economic activities such as do-it-yourself 
activities and neighborly help are typically excluded in the analysis of the shadow 
economy.
8) 
Kanniainen, Pääkönen & Schneider (2004) incorporate many of these insights 
in their model of the shadow economy. They hypothesize that tax hikes 
unambiguously increase the size of shadow economy, while the availability of 
public goods financed by taxes moderates participation in the shadow economy. 
The latter effect, however, depends on the ability to access these public goods. A 
shortcoming of this analysis is the neglected endogeneity of tax morale and good 
governance, as addressed by Feld & Frey (2007), who argue that tax compliance is 
the result of a complicated interaction between tax morale and deterrence 
measures. It must be clear to taxpayers what the rules of the game are and as 
deterrence measures serve as signals for the level of tax morale a society wants to 
elicit (Posner, 2000), deterrence may also crowd out the intrinsic motivation to pay 
taxes. Tax morale not only increases if taxpayers perceive the public goods 
received in exchange for their tax payments; it may also decrease if individuals 
perceive political decisions for public activities or the treatment of taxpayers by the 
tax authorities to be unfair. Tax morale is thus not exogenously given but 
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influenced by deterrence and the quality of state institutions. Table 2 presents an 
overview of the most important determinants influencing the shadow economy. 
 
Table 2. The main causes determining the shadow economy 
Causal variable Theoretical reasoning References 
Tax and social 
security 
contribution 
burdens 
The distortion of the overall tax burden affects labor-
leisure choices and may stimulate labor supply in the 
shadow economy. The bigger the difference between 
the total labor cost in the official economy and after-tax 
earnings (from work), the greater the incentive to 
reduce the tax wedge and work in the shadow economy. 
This tax wedge depends on social security 
burden/payments and the overall tax burden, making 
them key determinants in the existence of the shadow 
economy. 
E.g. Thomas (1992), Johnson, 
Kaufmann, & Zoido-Lobatón 
(1998a,1998b), Giles (1999a), 
Tanzi (1999), Schneider (2003; 
2005), Dell’Anno (2007), 
Dell’Anno, Gomez-Antonio & 
Alanon Pardo (2007), Buehn & 
Schneider (2012) 
Quality of 
institutions 
The quality of public institutions is another key factor 
in the development of the informal sector. In particular, 
the efficient and discretionary application of the tax 
code and regulations by the government plays a crucial 
role in the decision to work underground, even more 
important than the actual burden of taxes and 
regulations. A bureaucracy with highly corrupt 
government officials tends to be associated with larger 
unofficial activity, while good rule of law through 
securing property rights and contract enforceability 
increases the benefits of being formal. A certain level of 
taxation, mostly spent in productive public services, 
characterizes efficient policies. In fact, production in 
the formal sector benefits from higher provision of 
productive public services and is negatively affected by 
taxation, while the shadow economy reacts in the 
opposite way. An informal sector developing as a 
consequence of the failure of political institutions in 
promoting an efficient market economy, and 
entrepreneurs going underground due to inefficient 
public goods provision, may reduce if institutions can 
be strengthened and fiscal policy moves closer to the 
median voter’s preferences.  
E.g. Johnson et al. (1998a; 
1998b), Friedman, Johnson, 
Kaufmann, & Zoido-Lobatón 
(2000), Dreher & Schneider 
(2009), Dreher, Kotsogiannis & 
McCorriston (2009), Schneider 
(2010), Buehn & Schneider 
(2012), Teobaldelli (2011), 
Teobaldelli & Schneider 
(2012), Amendola & 
Dell’Anno (2010), Losby et al. 
(2002), Schneider & Williams 
(2013) 
Regulations 
Regulations, for example labor market regulations or 
trade barriers, are another important factor that reduces 
freedom (of choice) for individuals in the official 
economy. They lead to a substantial increase in labor 
costs in the official economy and thus provide another 
incentive to work in the shadow economy: countries 
that are more heavily regulated tend to have a higher 
share of the shadow economy in total GDP. Especially 
the enforcement and not the overall extent of regulation 
– mostly not enforced – is the key factor for the burden 
levied on firms and individuals, inducing them to 
operate in the shadow economy.  
E.g. Johnson, Kaufmann, & 
Shleifer (1997), Johnson, 
Kaufmann, & Zoido-Lobatón 
(1998b), Friedman, Johnson, 
Kaufmann, & Zoido-Lobaton 
(2000), Kucera & Roncolato 
(2008), Schneider (2011) 
Public sector 
services 
An increase in the shadow economy may lead to fewer 
state revenues, which in turn reduce the quality and 
quantity of publicly provided goods and services. 
Ultimately, this may lead to increasing tax rates for 
firms and individuals, although deterioration in the 
quality of the public goods (such as public 
infrastructure) and of the administration continues. The 
consequence is an even stronger incentive to participate 
in the shadow economy. Countries with higher tax 
revenues achieved by lower tax rates, fewer laws and 
regulations, a better rule of law and lower corruption 
levels should thus have smaller shadow economies.  
E.g. Johnson, Kaufmann, & 
Zoido-Lobatón (1998a; 1998b), 
Feld & Schneider (2010) 
Tax morale 
The efficiency of the public sector also has an indirect 
effect on the size of the shadow economy because it 
affects tax morale. Tax compliance is driven by a 
psychological tax contract that entails rights and 
obligations from taxpayers and citizens on the one 
hand, but also from the state and its tax authorities on 
the other hand. Taxpayers are more inclined to pay their 
E.g. Feld & Frey (2007), 
Kirchler (2007), Torgler & 
Schneider (2009), Feld & 
Larsen (2005; 2009), Feld & 
Schneider (2010) 
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taxes honestly if they get valuable public services in 
exchange. However, taxpayers are honest even in cases 
when the benefit principle of taxation does not hold, i.e. 
for redistributive policies, if such political decisions 
follow fair procedures. The treatment of taxpayers by 
the tax authority also plays a role. If taxpayers are 
treated like partners in a (tax) contract instead of 
subordinates in a hierarchical relationship, taxpayers 
will stick to the obligations of the psychological tax 
contract more easily. Hence, (better) tax morale and 
(stronger) social norms may reduce the probability of 
individuals working underground. 
Deterrence 
Despite the strong focus on deterrence in policies 
fighting the shadow economy and the unambiguous 
insights of the traditional economic theory of tax non-
compliance, surprisingly little is known from empirical 
studies about the effects of deterrence. This is because 
data on the legal background and the frequency of 
audits are not available on an international basis; even 
for OECD countries such data are difficult to collect. 
Either the legal background is quite complicated, 
differentiating fines and punishment according to the 
severity of the offense and the true income of the non-
complier, or tax authorities do not reveal how 
intensively auditing is taking place. The little empirical 
survey evidence available demonstrates that fines and 
punishment do not exert a negative influence on the 
shadow economy, while the subjectively perceived risk 
of detection does. However, results are often weak and 
Granger causality tests show that the size of the shadow 
economy can affect deterrence, instead of deterrence 
reducing the shadow economy. 
E.g. Andreoni, Erard & 
Feinstein (1998), Pedersen 
(2003), Feld & Larsen (2005; 
2009), Feld & Schneider (2010) 
Development 
of the official 
economy 
The development of the official economy is another key 
factor in the shadow economy. The higher (lower) the 
unemployment quota (GDP-growth), the higher the 
incentive to work in the shadow economy, ceteris 
paribus. 
Schneider & Williams (2013) 
Feld & Schneider (2010) 
Self-
employment 
The higher the rate of self-employment, the more 
activities can be performed in the shadow economy, 
ceteris paribus. 
Schneider & Williams (2013) 
Feld & Schneider (2010) 
 
3. Methods to Estimate the size of the Shadow Economcy 
Estimating the size of a shadow economy is a difficult and challenging task. In 
this paper we give a short but comprehensive overview of the various procedures 
for estimating the size of a shadow economy. Three different categories of 
measurement methods are most widely used, and each is briefly discussed. 
3.1. Direct approaches 
These are microeconomic approaches that employ either well-designed surveys 
and samples based on voluntary replies, or tax auditing and other compliance 
methods. Sample surveys designed to estimate the shadow economy are widely 
used
9)
. The main disadvantages of this method are the flaws inherent in all surveys. 
For example, the average precision and results depend greatly on the respondent’s 
willingness to cooperate, it is difficult to assess the amount of undeclared work 
from a direct questionnaire, most interviewees hesitate to confess to fraudulent 
behavior, and responses are of uncertain reliability, which makes it difficult to 
calculate a true estimate (in monetary terms) of the extent of undeclared work. The 
main advantage of this method lies in the detailed information which can be 
obtained about the structure of the shadow economy, but results from these kinds 
of surveys are very sensitive to the way the questionnaire is formulated
10)
. 
Estimates of the shadow economy can also be based on the discrepancy between 
income declared for tax purposes and that measured by selective checks. Fiscal 
auditing programs have been particularly effective in this regard. Since these 
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programs are designed to measure the amount of undeclared taxable income, they 
may also be used to calculate the size of the shadow economy
11)
. However, a 
number of difficulties beset this approach. First, using tax compliance data is 
equivalent to using a (possibly biased) sample of the population. In general, the 
selection of taxpayers for tax audits is not random but based on properties of 
submitted (tax) returns that indicate a certain likelihood of tax fraud. Consequently, 
such a sample is not a random one of the whole population, and estimates of the 
shadow economy based upon a biased sample may not be accurate. Second, 
estimates based on tax audits reflect only that portion of the shadow economy 
discovered by income tax authorities, and this is likely to be only a fraction of all 
hidden income. 
Survey results can also be inconsistent internationally. In addition to the studies 
by Feld & Larsen (2005; 2008; 2009), Haigner et al. (2013), and Enste & 
Schneider (2006) for Germany, survey methods have been applied in the Northern 
countries and Great Britain (Isachsen & Strøm (1985), Pedersen (2003)) as well as 
in the Netherlands (Van Eck & Kazemier (1988), Kazemier (2006)). The 
questionnaires underlying these studies are broadly comparable in design; however, 
recent attempts by the European Union to provide survey results for all member 
states have run into great difficulties of comparability (Renooy et al. (2004), 
European Commission (2007)). The wording of the questionnaires becomes more 
and more cumbersome, depending on the culture of different countries with respect 
to the underground economy. 
A further disadvantage of these two direct methods (surveys and tax auditing) is 
the point estimate character. In general they capture shadow economic activities 
only partially and may be seen as lower-bound estimates. Going back to the 
definition of the shadow economy, this method captures mostly the amount of 
shadow labor activities in households and rarely in or between firms and these 
methods do not provide value added figures. However, they have one considerable 
advantage: they provide detailed information about shadow economy activities, the 
structure and composition of the activities as well as the socio-economic 
characteristics and motives of those who work in the shadow economy. 
To summarize: 
Survey methods are likely to underestimate the shadow economy because 
people are likely to under-declare in surveys what they are trying to hide from 
authorities. In order to minimize the number of respondents dishonestly replying or 
totally declining to answer sensitive questions, structured interviews are undertaken 
(usually face to face), in which respondents slowly become accustomed to the main 
purpose of the survey. The first part of the questionnaire aims to shape 
respondents’ perceptions of the issues being explored. The second part asks 
questions about the respondents’ activities in the shadow economy.  A third part 
contains the usual socio-demographic questions. Nevertheless, the results of the 
shadow economy estimates from survey methods are clearly lower-bound estimates 
compared to other approaches. They also rely on a very narrow definition of 
“classical” shadow economy activities. 
3.2. Indirect approaches 
These approaches, which are also called indicator approaches, are mostly 
macroeconomic and use various economic and other indicators that contain 
information about the development of the shadow economy over time. Relating 
them to the definition of the shadow economy, they provide value added figures. In 
most cases, legally-bought material is often included; hence, they provide upper-
bound estimates with the danger of a double counting problem due to the inclusion 
of the legally-bought material. Therefore a wide (broad) definition of the shadow 
economy is applied; especially as some criminal activities like human trafficking 
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are also included. Currently there are five indicators that leave some traces of the 
shadow economy. 
3.2.1. The discrepancy between national expenditure and income statistics 
This approach is based on discrepancies between income and expenditure 
statistics. In national accounting the income measure of GNP should be equal to the 
expenditure measure of GNP. Thus, if an independent estimate of the expenditure 
side of the national accounts is available, the gap between the expenditure measure 
and the income measure can be used as an indicator of the extent of the shadow 
economy.
12 )
 Since national accounts statisticians are anxious to minimize this 
discrepancy, the initial discrepancy or first estimate, rather than the published 
discrepancy, should be employed as an estimate of the shadow economy. If all the 
components on the expenditure side are measured without error, then this approach 
would indeed yield a good estimate of the size of the shadow economy. 
Unfortunately, however, this is not the case. Instead, the discrepancy reflects all 
omissions and errors in the national accounts statistics as well as the shadow 
economy. These estimates may therefore be crude and of questionable reliability.
13)
  
3.2.2. The discrepancy between the official and actual labor force  
A decline in participation in the labor force in the official economy can be seen 
as an indication of increased activity in the shadow economy. If total labor force 
participation is assumed to be constant, then a decreasing official rate of 
participation can be seen as an indicator of increased shadow economic activities, 
ceteris paribus.
14)
 One weakness of this method is that differences in the rate of 
participation may have other causes. Also, people can work in the shadow 
economy and have a job in the official economy. Therefore such estimates may be 
viewed as weak indicators of the size and development of the shadow economy. 
3.2.3. The transactions approach 
This approach has been fully developed by Feige.
15 )
 It is based upon the 
assumption that there is a constant relation over time between the volume of 
transactions and official GNP, as summarized by the well-known Fisher quantity 
equation, or M*V = p*T (with M money, V velocity, p prices, and T total 
transactions). Assumptions also have to be made about the velocity of money and 
about the relationships between the total value of transactions p*T and total 
(official + unofficial) nominal GNP. Relating total nominal GNP to total 
transactions, the GNP of the shadow economy can be calculated by subtracting 
official GNP from total nominal GNP.  
However, to derive figures for the shadow economy, one must also assume a 
base year in which there is no shadow economy and therefore the ratio of p*T to 
total nominal (official = total) GNP was “normal” and would have been constant 
over time if there had been no shadow economy. To obtain reliable shadow 
economy estimates, precise figures on the total volume of transactions should be 
available. This might be especially difficult for cash transactions, because they 
depend, among other factors, on the durability of bank notes in terms of the quality 
of the paper on which they are printed.
16)
 Also, the assumption is made that all 
variations in the ratio between the total value of transactions and the officially 
measured GNP are due to the shadow economy. This means that a considerable 
amount of data is required in order to eliminate financial transactions from “pure” 
cross payments, which are legal and have nothing to do with the shadow economy. 
In general, although this approach is theoretically attractive, the empirical 
requirements necessary to obtain reliable estimates are so difficult to fulfill that its 
application can lead to doubtful results. Again, here a very broad definition of the 
shadow economy is used, especially as all transactions (including criminal ones) 
are counted. 
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3.2.4. The currency demand approach 
The currency demand approach was first used by Cagan (1958), who considered 
the correlation between currency demand and tax pressure (as one cause of the 
shadow economy) for the United States over the period 1919 to 1955. Twenty 
years later, Gutmann (1977) used the same approach but without any statistical 
procedures. Cagan’s approach was further developed by Tanzi (1980; 1983), who 
estimated a currency demand function for the United States for the period 1929 to 
1980 in order to calculate the size of the shadow economy. His approach assumes 
that shadow (or hidden) transactions are undertaken in the form of cash payments 
so as to leave no observable traces for the authorities. An increase in the size of the 
shadow economy will therefore increase the demand for currency. To isolate the 
resulting excess demand for currency, an equation for currency demand is 
estimated over time. All possible conventional factors, such as the development of 
income, payment habits, interest rates, credit and other debt cards as a substitute for 
cash and so on, are controlled for. Additionally, variables such as direct and 
indirect tax burdens, government regulation, state institutions and tax morale, 
which are assumed to be major factors causing people to work in the shadow 
economy, are included in the estimation equation. The basic regression equation 
for currency demand, proposed by Tanzi (1983), is the following: 
    
ln (C / M2)t = O + 1 ln (1 + TW)t + 2 ln (WS / Y)t + 3 ln Rt + 4 ln (Y / N)t + ut, 
 
with 1 > 0, 2 > 0, 3 < 0, 4 > 0, where ln denotes natural logarithms, C/M2 is 
the ratio of cash holdings to current and deposit accounts, TW is a weighted 
average tax rate (as a proxy for changes in the size of the shadow economy), WS/Y 
is a proportion of wages and salaries in national income (to capture changing 
payment and money holding patterns), R is the interest paid on savings deposits (to 
capture the opportunity cost of holding cash) and Y/N is per capita income.
17)
 Any 
“excess” increase in currency, or the amount unexplained by conventional or 
normal factors, is then attributed to the rising tax burden and other reasons leading 
people to work in the shadow economy. Figures for the size and development of 
the shadow economy can be calculated in a first step by comparing the difference 
between the development of currency when the direct and indirect tax burden and 
government regulation are held at lowest values, and the development of currency 
with the current (higher) burden of taxation and government regulation. Assuming 
in a second step the same income velocity for currency used in the shadow 
economy as for legal M1 in the official economy, the size of the shadow can be 
computed and compared to the official GDP.   
This is one of the most commonly used approaches. It has been applied to many 
countries
18 )
 all over the world but has nevertheless been criticized on various 
grounds.
19)
 The most commonly raised objections to this method are:  
(1)  Not all transactions in the shadow economy are paid in cash. Isachsen & 
Strøm (1985) used the survey method to find out that in Norway, in 1980, roughly 
80 percent of all transactions in the hidden sector were paid in cash. The size of the 
total shadow economy (including barter) may thus be even larger than previously 
estimated.  
(2)  Most studies consider only one factor, the tax burden, as the cause of the 
shadow economy. Other factors (such as the impact of regulation, taxpayers’ 
attitudes toward the state, tax morality and so on) are not considered, because for 
most countries reliable data are not available. If, as seems likely, these other factors 
also have an impact on the extent of the hidden economy, it might again be higher 
than reported in most studies.
20)
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(3)  As discussed by Garcia (1978), Park (1979), and Feige (1996), increases in 
currency demand deposits are largely due to a slowdown in demand deposits rather 
than to an increase in currency caused by activities in the shadow economy, at least 
in the case of the United States.  
(4)  Blades (1982) and Feige (1986; 1996) criticize Tanzi’s studies on the 
grounds that the US dollar is used as an international currency so Tanzi should 
have considered (and controlled for) the presence of US dollars, which are used as 
an international currency and held in cash abroad.
21)
 Frey & Pommerehne (1984) 
and Thomas (1986; 1992; 1999) claim that Tanzi’s parameter estimates are not 
very stable.
22)   
(5)  Most studies assume the same velocity of money in official and shadow 
economies. As argued by Hill & Kabir (1996) for Canada and by Klovland (1984) 
for the Scandinavian countries, there is considerable uncertainty about the velocity 
of money in the official economy, and the velocity of money in the hidden sector is 
even more difficult to estimate. Without knowledge about the velocity of currency 
in the shadow economy, one has to accept the assumption of that money has equal 
velocity in each sector.   
(6)  Ahumada, Alvaredo, Canavese, & Canavese (2004) show that the currency 
approach together with the assumption of equal income velocity of money in 
reported and hidden transactions is only correct if the income elasticity is 1.   
(7)  Finally, the assumption of no shadow economy in a base year is open to 
criticism. Relaxing this assumption would again imply an upward adjustment of the 
size of the shadow economy. 
Again here a broad definition of the shadow economy is used as all cash 
transactions with some relation to the shadow economy are captured by this 
method.  
3.2.5. The physical input (electricity consumption) method 
3.2.5.1. The Kaufmann - Kaliberda Method
23)
 
To measure overall (official and unofficial) economic activity in an economy, 
Kaufmann & Kaliberda (1996) assume that electric power consumption is regarded 
as the single best physical indicator of overall (or official plus unofficial) economic 
activity.  Overall economic activity and electricity consumption have been 
empirically observed throughout the world to move in lockstep with an electricity-
to-GDP elasticity usually close to one. This means that the growth of total 
electricity consumption is an indicator for growth of overall (official and 
unofficial) GDP. By having this proxy measurement for the overall economy and 
then subtracting from this overall measure the estimates of official GDP, 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) derive an estimate of unofficial GDP. This 
method is very simple and appealing. However, it can also be criticized on various 
grounds:  
(1)  Not all shadow economy activities require a considerable amount of 
electricity (e.g. personal services), and other energy sources can be used (gas, oil, 
coal, etc.). Only a part of the shadow economy will be indicated.   
(2)  Over time, there has been considerable technical progress so that both the 
production and use of electricity are more efficient than in the past, and this will 
apply in both official and unofficial uses.   
(3)  There may be considerable differences or changes in the elasticity of 
electricity/GDP across countries and over time.
24)
 
3.2.5.2. The Lackó method 
Lackó (1998; 1999; 2000a; 2000b) assumes that a certain part of the shadow 
economy is associated with the household consumption of electricity. This part 
comprises so-called household production, do-it-yourself activities, and other non-
registered production and services. Lackó further assumes that in countries where 
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the portion of the shadow economy associated with household electricity 
consumption is high, the rest of the hidden economy (or the part Lackó cannot 
measure) will also be high. Lackó (1996, pp.19 ff.) assumes that in each country a 
part of the household consumption of electricity is used in the shadow economy. 
Lackó’s approach (1998, p.133) can be described by the following two equations: 
 
ln Ei = 1 ln Ci + 2 ln PRi + 3 Gi + 4 Qi + 5 Hi + ui, with 1 > 0, 2 < 0, 3 
> 0, 4 < 0, 5 > 0  and 
 
 Hi= 1 Ti + 2 (Si – Ti) + 3 Di   with 1 > 0, 2 < 0, 3 > 0  
 
where i indicates  the number assigned to the country,  
Ei is per capita household electricity consumption in country i,  
Ci is per capita real consumption of households without the consumption of 
electricity in country i in US dollars (at purchasing power parity),  
PRi is the real price of consumption of 1 kWh of residential electricity in US 
dollars (at purchasing power parity),  
Gi is the relative frequency of months requiring heating in houses in country i,  
Qi is the ratio of energy sources other than electricity energy to all energy 
sources in household energy consumption,  
Hi is the per capita output of the hidden economy,  
Ti is the ratio of the sum of paid personal income, corporate profit and taxes on 
goods and services to GDP,  
Si is the ratio of public social welfare expenditures to GDP, and  
Di is the sum of the number of dependants over 14 years and inactive earners, 
both per 100 active earners.   
In a cross country study, she estimates the first equation substituting for Hi with 
the second equation. For the calculation of the actual size (value added) of the 
shadow economy, Lackó further needs to know how much GDP is produced by one 
unit of electricity in the shadow economy of each country. Since these data are not 
known, she takes the result of one of the known shadow economy estimates 
calculated for a market economy using another approach for the early 1990s, and 
applies this to the other countries. Lackó used the shadow economy of the United 
States as such a base (the shadow economy value of 10.5% of GDP was taken from 
Morris (1993)) and calculated the size of the shadow economy for other countries. 
Lackó's method is also open to criticism:  
(1)  Not all shadow economy activities require a considerable amount of 
electricity and other energy sources can be used.   
(2)  Shadow economy activities do not take place only in the household sector.   
(3)  It is doubtful whether the ratio of social welfare expenditures can be used 
as the explanatory factor for the shadow economy, especially in transition and 
developing countries.   
(4)  It is questionable which is the most reliable base value of the shadow 
economy in order to calculate the size of the shadow economy for all other 
countries, especially for transition and developing countries. 
Also, these two approaches rely on a broad definition of the shadow economy, 
because they measure all (illegal) activities which require electric power. 
3.2.6. The model approach
25
 
3.2.6.1. General remarks 
All methods described so far consider just one indicator to capture all effects of 
the shadow economy. However, shadow economy effects show up simultaneously 
in production, labor, and money markets. An even more important critique is that 
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the causes determining the size of the shadow economy are taken into account only 
in some of the monetary approach studies that usually consider one cause, the 
burden of taxation. The model approach explicitly considers multiple causes of the 
existence and growth of the shadow economy
26)
, as well as the multiple effects of 
the shadow economy over time.  The empirical method used is quite different from 
those used so far. It is based on the statistical theory of unobserved variables, 
which considers multiple causes and multiple indicators of the phenomenon to be 
measured.  
As the size of the shadow economy is an unknown (hidden) figure, a latent 
estimator approach using the MIMIC (i.e. multiple indicators, multiple causes 
estimation) procedure is applied. This method is based on the statistical theory of 
unobserved variables. The statistical idea behind such a model is to compare a 
sample covariance matrix, that is, a covariance matrix of observable variables, with 
the parametric structure imposed on this matrix by a hypothesized model.
27)
 Using 
covariance information among the observable variables, the unobservable variable 
is in the first step linked to observable variables in a factor analytical model, also 
called a measurement model. Second, relationships between the unobservable 
variable and observable variables are specified through a structural model. 
Therefore, a MIMIC model is the simultaneous specification of a factor and a 
structural model. In this sense, the MIMIC model tests the consistency of a 
“structural” theory through data and is thus a confirmatory rather than an 
exploratory technique. An economic theory is thus tested examining the 
consistency of actual data with the hypothesized relationships between the 
unobservable (latent) variable or factor and the observable (measurable) 
variables.
28)
 In general, a confirmatory factor analysis has two goals: (i) to estimate 
parameters such as coefficients and variances; and (ii) to assess the fit of the 
model. For the analysis of shadow economy activities these two goals mean (i) to 
estimate the relationships between a set of observable variables, divided into causes 
and indicators, and the shadow economy activity (unobservable variable); and (ii) 
to test whether the researcher’s theory or the derived hypotheses as a whole fit the 
data. MIMIC models are, compared to regression models, a rarely used method by 
economists, which might be due to under-evaluation of their capabilities with 
respect to their potential contribution to economic research. 
3.2.6.2. A detailed description of the MIMIC model
29
 
The concept of the MIMIC model is to examine the relationships between a 
latent variable “size of shadow economy” and observable variables in terms of the 
relationships among a number of observable variables by using their information of 
covariance. The observable variables are grouped into causes and indicators of the 
latent variable (see figure 1). The key advantages of the MIMIC approach are that 
it allows modeling of shadow economy activities as an unobservable (latent) 
variable and that it considers its multiple determinants (causes) and multiple effects 
(indicators). A factor-analytic approach is applied to measure the size of shadow 
economy activities as an unobserved variable over time. The unknown coefficients 
are estimated in a set of structural equations, as the “unobserved” variable, 
meaning that the size of the shadow economy cannot be measured directly. 
Formally, the MIMIC model consists of two parts: a structural equation model and 
a measurement model.  
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Figure 1. The MIMIC model 
Source: Buehn and Schneider (2013), p. 177. 
 
In the measurement model, the unobservable variable t  determines a p  vector 
',...,, 21 



 ptttt yyyy' of indicators, that is, observable variables that reflect shadow 
economy activities, subject to a p  vector of random error terms 
 ',...,,' 21 ptttt   . The unobservable variable t  is a scalar and λ  is a p  
column vector of parameters that relates ty  to t . The measurement equation is 
given by: 
 
t t ty λ ε     (2) 
 
The structural model determines the unobservable variable t  by a set of 
exogenous causes  ',...,,' 21 qtttt xxxx   that may be useful in predicting its 
movement and size, subject to a structural disturbance error term t . The structural 
equation is given by: 
 
t t  
'
tγ x   (3) 
 
where 'γ  is a q  row vector of structural parameters.30)  
Substituting (2) into (3) yields a reduced form equation which expresses the 
relationships between the observed causes and indicators, that is, between  tx  and 
ty . This is shown in equation (4): 
 
t t ty = Πx + z   (4) 
where  'Π λγ  is a reduced form coefficient matrix and t t tz λ ε  is a  
reduced form vector of a linear transformation of disturbances that has a reduced form 
covariance matrix Ω  given as: 
 
Cov( ) E[( )( ) ]t t        t t t εΩ z λ ε λ ε λ λ Θ  (5) 
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In equation (5), Var( )t   and  E ε t tΘ ε ε  is the measurement error’s 
covariance matrix. 
In general, estimation of a MIMIC model uses covariance information of 
sample data to derive estimates of population parameters. Instead of minimizing 
the distance between observed and predicted individual values, as in standard 
econometrics, the MIMIC model minimizes the distance between an observed 
(sample) covariance matrix and the covariance matrix predicted by the model the 
researcher imposes on the data. The idea behind such an approach is that the 
covariance matrix of the observed variables is a function of a set of model 
parameters: 
 
 Σ Σ θ   (6) 
 
where Σ  is the population covariance matrix of the observed variables, θ  is a 
vector that contains the parameters of the model and  Σ θ is the covariance 
matrix as a function of θ , implying that each element of the covariance matrix is a 
function of one or more model parameters. If the hypothesized model is correct and 
the parameters are known, the population covariance matrix would be exactly 
reproduced, that is, Σ  will equal  Σ θ . In practice, however, one does not know 
either the population variances and covariances or the parameters, but instead uses 
the sample covariance matrix and sample estimates of the unknown parameters for 
estimation (Bollen, 1989, p. 256). 
It is commonly accepted by most scholars who estimate the size of shadow 
economic activities using the MIMIC model or more general Structural Equation 
Models (SEMs) with more than one unobservable variable, that such an empirical 
exercise is a “minefield”, regardless of which method is used. In evaluating the 
currently available shadow economy estimates of different scholars, one should 
keep in mind that there is no best or commonly accepted method.  
In comparison to other statistical methods, SEMs/MIMIC models offer several 
advantages for the estimation of shadow economic activities. According to Giles & 
Tedds (2002), the MIMIC approach is a wider approach than most other competing 
methods, since it allows one to take multiple indicator and causal variables into 
consideration at the same time. Moreover, this approach is quite flexible, allowing 
one to vary the choice of causal and indicator variables according to the particular 
features of the shadow economic activity studied, the period in question, and the 
availability of data. SEMs/MIMIC models lead to formal estimation and testing 
procedures, such as those based on the method of maximum likelihood. These 
procedures are well known and are generally “optimal” if the sample is sufficiently 
large (Giles & Tedds, 2002). Schneider & Enste (2000) emphasize that these 
models lead to some progress in estimation techniques for the size and 
development of the shadow economy, because this methodology allows wide 
flexibility in its application. Therefore, they consider it potentially superior to other 
estimation methods. Cassar (2001) argues that, when compared to other methods, 
SEMs/MIMIC models do not need restrictive assumptions to operate. Similarly, 
Thomas (1992, p. 168) argues that the only real constraint of this approach is not in 
its conceptual structure, but in the choice of variables. These positive aspects of the 
SEM approach in general and the MIMIC model in particular do not only apply in 
its application to the shadow economy, but to all informal economic activities. This 
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means that the MIMIC procedure relies on a broad definition of the shadow 
economy. 
3.2.6.3. Criticism of the MIMIC model 
Of course this method has its limitations, too, which are identified in the 
literature. The three most important points of criticism focus on the model’s 
implementation, the sample used, and the reliability of the estimates: 
(1)  The most frequent objection is around the meaning of the latent variable 
(e.g. Helberger & Knepel, 1988; Dell’Anno, 2003). The confirmatory rather than 
exploratory nature of this approach means that one is more likely to determine 
whether a certain model is valid than to “find” a suitable model. Therefore, it is 
possible that the specified model includes potential definitions or informal 
economic activities other than those studied. For example, it is difficult for a 
researcher to ensure that traditional crime activities such as drug dealing are 
completely excluded from analysis of the shadow economy. This criticism, which 
is probably the most common in the literature, remains difficult to overcome as it 
goes back to the theoretical assumptions behind the choice of variables and 
empirical limitations on data availability. 
(2)  Helberger & Knepel (1988) argue that SEM/MIMIC model estimations 
lead to unstable coefficients with respect to changes in the sample size and 
alternative model specifications. Dell’Anno (2003) shows, however, that instability 
disappears asymptotically as the sample size increases. Another issue is the 
application of SEMs to time series data because only simple analytical tools such 
as q- and stemleaf plots are available to analyze the properties of the residuals 
(Dell’Anno, 2003).31) 
(3)  Criticism is also made with respect to the benchmarking procedure used to 
derive “real world” figures of shadow economic activities (Breusch, 2005a; 
2005b). As the latent variable and its unit of measurement are not observed, SEMs 
only provide a set of estimated coefficients from which one can calculate an index 
that shows the dynamics of the unobservable variable. Application of the so-called 
calibration or benchmarking procedure, regardless which one is used, requires 
experimentation, and a comparison of the calibrated values in a wide academic 
debate. Unfortunately, at this stage of research it is not clear which benchmarking 
method is the best or the most reliable.
32) 
The economic literature using SEMs is well aware of these limitations. It 
acknowledges that it is not an easy task to apply this methodology to an economic 
dataset, but also argues that this does not mean one should abandon the SEM 
approach. On the contrary, following an interdisciplinary approach to economics, 
SEMs are valuable tools for economic analysis, particularly when studying the 
shadow economy. Moreover, the objections mentioned should be considered 
incentives for further research in this field rather than as a reason to abandon the 
method. Again going back to the definition of the shadow economy, the MIMIC 
estimation provides upper-bound macro value added figures, including mostly 
legally-bought material. 
3.3. Results of the size of the German shadow economy using the various 
estimation methods 
Finally, so the interested reader can see how big the variance between the 
different estimations of the size of the shadow economy is, the results for the case 
of Germany are shown. A significant amount of empirical work has been 
undertaken on the shadow economy in Germany and this makes it an interesting 
case study. The results are shown in table 3. The oldest estimate uses the survey 
method of the Institut für Demoskopie (IfD) in Allensbach (Germany) and shows 
that the shadow economy was 3.6% of official GDP in 1974. In a much later study 
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Feld & Larsen (2005; 2009) undertook an extensive research project using the 
survey method to estimate shadow economy activities in the years 2001 to 2006. 
Using the officially paid wage rate, they concluded that shadow economy activities 
reached 4.1% in 2001, 3.1% in 2004, 3.6% in 2005 and 2.5% in 2006. Using the 
much lower shadow economy wage rate, these estimates shrink, however, to 1.3% 
in 2001 and 1.0% in 2004. 
As discussed, we know that the survey method underestimates the size of the 
shadow economy. Using the discrepancy method and applying national income 
statistics, Lippert & Walker (1997) estimate the size of the German shadow 
economy from 1970 to 1980 as between 11.0% and 13.4% of official GDP. Using 
the discrepancy method applying official and actual employment, Langfeldt (1983) 
gets much higher estimates for 1970 to 1980, ranging from 23.0% to 34.0%. 
Applying the physical input method (electricity approach), Feld & Larsen (2005) 
get results of 14.5% for the year 1985 and 14.6% for 1990. The monetary 
transaction method developed by Feige calculates the shadow economy to be about 
30% between 1980 and 1985. These are the highest estimates for the case of 
Germany. Switching to the currency demand approach, first used by Kirchgässner 
(1983; 1984), his study provides values of 3.1% in 1970 and 10.3% in 1980. 
Kirchgässner’s values are quite similar to those obtained by Schneider & Enste 
(2000; 2002), who also use the currency demand approach to estimate the size of 
the shadow economy, obtaining figures of 4.5% in 1970 and 14.7% in 2000. Using 
the MIMIC estimation procedure, which was first applied by Frey & Weck (1983), 
the results are quite similar to those from the currency demand approach.
33)
 Frey & 
Weck (1983) calculate a shadow economy in Germany in 1970 of 5.8% which 
increases to 8.2% in 1980. Pickardt & Sarda (2006), whose sample used for the 
MIMIC estimations started a bit later, get a value of 9.4% in 1980, which increases 
to 16.3% in the year 2000. These are quite similar values to Schneider (2005; 
2007). Finally, using the soft modeling variant of the MIMIC approach, Weck-
Hannemann (1983) finds a value of 8.3% of GDP in 1975.  
Considering table 3, one can see that different estimation procedures produce 
different results. It is safe to say that the figures produced by the transactions and 
discrepancy approaches are unrealistically large. A size of the shadow economy of 
almost one third of official GDP in the mid-eighties is most likely to be an 
overestimate. The figures obtained using the currency demand and the hidden 
(latent, MIMIC) approaches are, on the other hand, relatively close together and 
much lower than those produced by the discrepancy or transactions approach. The 
estimates from the MIMIC approach can be regarded as the most reasonable 
estimates of the size of the shadow economy and the survey model is likely to 
produce excessively low estimates for reasons already discussed. 
Finally, in table 4 a comparison of the size of the German shadow economy 
using the survey method and the MIMIC method for the year 2006 is undertaken. 
As we see, the difference between the estimates of the macro-method (here the 
MIMIC estimation procedure) and the results from the survey method is quite 
large. In table 4 an attempt is undertaken to demonstrate the major difference 
between these two estimation methods. The first line of table 4 clearly shows 
shadow economy activities from labor (hours worked, survey results). They range 
from 5.0% to 6.0% in the year 2006. If one adds to this used material, illegal 
activities and those which are already included in official GDP, one gets a value 
between 13.0% and 17.0% of GDP, which comes very close to the 15.0% of the 
MIMIC estimation results. The macro-results, of course, include used materials and 
illegal activities, so it is not unexpected to find much larger results. 
 
 
Turkish Economic Review 
 TER, 3(2), F. Schneider, p.256-280. 
271 
271 
Table 3. The Size of the Shadow Economy in Germany According to Different Methods (in 
percentage of official GDP) 
Method/Source 
Shadow economy (in percentage of official GDP) in: 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Survey  
(IfD Allensbach, 1975) 
(Feld & Larsen, 2005) 
- 3.6 
1)
 - - - - - - 
- - - - - - 4.1 
2)
 3.1 
2)
 
- - - - - - 1.3 
3)
 1.0 
3)
 
Discrepancy between 
expenditure and income 
(Lippert & Walker, 1997) 
11.0 10.2 13.4 - - - - - 
Discrepancy between 
official and actual 
employment (Langfeldt, 
1983) 
23.0 38.5 34.0 - - - - - 
Physical input method (Feld 
& Larsen, 2005) 
- - - 14.5 14.6 - - - 
Transactions approach 17.2 22.3 29.3 31.4 - - - - 
Currency demand approach  
(Kirchgässner, 1983)  
(Langfeldt, 1983; 1984)  
Schneider & Enste (2000) 
3.1 6.0 10.3 - - - - - 
12.1 11.8 12.6 - - - - - 
4.5 7.8 9.2 11.3 11.8 12.5 14.7 - 
Latent ((DY)MIMIC) 
approach 
Frey & Weck (1983) 
Pickardt & Sarda (2006) 
Schneider (2005; 2007) 
5.8 6.1 8.2 - - - - - 
- - 9.4 10.1 11.4 15.1 16.3 - 
4.2 5.8 10.8 11.2 12.2 13.9 16.0 15.4 
Soft modeling (Weck-
Hannemann, 1983) 
- 8.3 - - - - - - 
Notes. 1) 1974; 2) 2001 and 2004; calculated using wages in the official economy; 3) 2001 and 2004; 
calculated using actual “black” hourly wages paid. 
Source: Feld & Schneider (2010), p. 132, table 12; Schneider & Enste (2000), pp. 106–107, table 8 
(Germany only). 
 
Table 4. A comparison of the Size of the German Shadow Economy using survey and 
MIMIC methods, year 2006 
Various kinds of shadow 
economy activities/values 
Shadow Economy 
in % of official 
GDP 
Shadow 
Economy in bill. 
Euro 
% share of the overall 
shadow economy 
Shadow economy activities 
from labor (hours worked, 
survey results) 
+ Material (used) 
+ Illegal activities (goods and 
services) 
+ already in the official GDP 
included illegal activities 
5.0 – 6.0 
3.0 – 4.0 
4.0 – 5.0 
1.0 – 2.0 
117 – 140 
70 – 90 
90 – 117 
23 – 45 
33 – 40 
20 – 25 
25 – 33 
7 – 13 
Sum (1) to (4) 13.0 – 17.0 300 – 392 85 – 111 
Overall (total) shadow 
economy (estimated by the 
MIMIC and calibrated by the 
currency demand procedure) 
15.0 340 100 
Source: Enste and Schneider (2006) and own calculations 
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4. Summary and Concluding Remark: Problems and Open 
Questions 
In this paper some of the most recent developments in research about the 
measurement of the shadow economy are described and critiqued. The discussion 
of the recent literature shows that the measurement methods cover a huge area and, 
hence, produce quite different results (compare table 3) with huge variances. First, 
if we summarize our findings about the methods to estimate the size and 
development of the shadow economy, we come to the following critical remarks: 
The survey method has the disadvantages that often only households are 
considered and firms are, at least partly, left out, that non-responses and/or 
incorrect responses are given, and that results for the financial volume of “black” 
hours worked and not of value added are obtained (compare here Feld & Larsen 
(2005; 2008; 2009), and Kazemier (2006)). 
The discrepancy method has the difficulties that quite often a combination of 
“rough” estimations and unclear assumptions about them is used, the calculation 
method is often not clear, and the documentation and procedures are often not 
made public (compare here Thomas (1992)). 
The monetary and/or electricity methods result in some very high estimates and 
only macro-estimates are available. Moreover, a breakdown by sector or industry is 
not possible, and there are challenges in converting millions of kWh into a value 
added figure when using the electricity method (compare Thomas (1992), and 
Schneider & Williams (2013)). 
The MIMIC (latent) method has a number of critical points including: only 
relative coefficients (no absolute values) are obtained, the estimations are quite 
often highly sensitive with respect to changes in data and specifications, there are 
difficulties in differentiating between the selection of causes and indicators, and the 
calibration procedure and starting values used have a great influence on the results 
(compare Breusch (2005a; 2005b), and Schneider & Williams (2013)). 
Second, what type of conclusions can we draw and what have we learnt during 35 
years of shadow economy research? 
(1) There is no ideal or leading method to estimate the size and development of the 
shadow economy. All methods have serious methodological problems and 
weaknesses. 
(2) If possible, researchers should use several methods to come closer to the “true” 
value of the size and development of the shadow economy. 
(3) Much more research is needed with respect to estimation methodology and 
empirical results for different countries and periods. 
(4) The focus should now be on micro-shadow economy research, and on 
undertaking experiments in order to reach two goals:  
(i) a better micro-foundation, and  
(ii) better knowledge of why people work in the shadow economy, what 
motivates them and what they earn. 
Third and finally, which questions remain unanswered? 
(1) A common and internationally accepted definition of the shadow economy is 
still missing. Such a definition or convention is needed to make comparisons 
between the shadow economies of different countries more reliable. 
(2) The link between theory and empirical estimation of the shadow economy is 
still unsatisfactory. In the best case theory provides us with derived signs of the 
causal factors, but the “core” causal factors are still unknown, as are the “core” 
indicators in which shadow economy activities are reflected. 
(3) A satisfactory validation method should be developed for the empirical results 
to make it easier to judge their plausibility. 
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Notes 
 
1) See e.g. Feld & Schneider (2010), Gerxhani (2003), Schneider (2011), Schneider & Williams 
(2013), and Williams & Schneider (2016). 
2)  Great parts of this paper were written in late 2013 and early 2014. A final revision was done in 
early 2016. From parts of this paper I made a German translation in fall 2014 which was published 
in the scientific journal Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik with the title “Schattenwirtschaft und 
Schattenarbeitsmarkt: Die Entwicklungen der vergangenen 20 Jahre”, Schneider (2015).  
3) See Frey & Pommerehne (1984), Thomas (1992), Loayza (1996), Pozo (1996), Lippert & Walker 
(1997), Schneider (1994a; 1994b; 1997; 1998; 2003; 2005; 2011), Johnson, Kaufmann, & Shleifer 
(1997), Johnson, Kaufmann & Zoido-Lobatón (1998a), Belev (2003), Gerxhani (2003), and 
Pedersen (2003). For newer surveys, see Schneider & Enste (2000; 2002), Schneider & Williams 
(2013), Alm, et al. (2004) and Feld & Schneider (2010). 
4) This definition is used, for example, by Feige (1989; 1994), Schneider (1994a; 2003; 2005; 2011), 
and Frey & Pommerehne (1984). Do-it-yourself activities are not included. For estimates of the 
shadow economy and do-it-yourself activities for Germany, see Buehn, Karmann & Schneider 
(2009). This definition is taken from Del’Anno (2003), Del’Anno & Schneider (2004) and Feige 
(1989).  See also Thomas (1999), Fleming, Roman & Farrell (2000). 
5) This definition is taken from Del’Anno (2003), Del’Anno & Schneider (2004) and Feige (1989).  
See also Thomas (1999), Fleming, Roman & Farrell (2000). 
6) Compare also the excellent discussion of the definition of the shadow economy in Pedersen (2003, 
pp.13–19), who uses a similar definition. 
7) Although classical crime activities such as drug dealing are independent of increasing taxes and the 
causal variables included in the empirical models are only imperfectly linked (or causal) to classical 
crime activities, the footprints used to indicate shadow economic activities such as currency in 
circulation also apply for classic crime. Hence, macroeconomic shadow economy estimates do not 
typically distinguish legal from illegal underground activities; rather they represent the whole 
informal economy spectrum. 
8) From a social perspective, maybe even from an economic one, soft forms of illicit employment such 
as moonlighting (e.g. construction work in private homes) and its contribution to aggregate value 
added may be assessed positively. For a discussion of these issues see Thomas (1992) and Buehn, 
Karmann & Schneider (2009).  
9) The direct method of voluntary sample surveys has been extensively used for Norway by Isachsen 
et al. (1982), and Isachsen & Strom (1985). For Denmark this method is used by Mogensen et al. 
(1995) in which they report “estimates” of the shadow economy of 2.7% of GDP for 1989, 4.2% of 
GDP for 1991, 3.0% of GDP for 1993 and 3.1% of GDP for 1994. In Pedersen (2003) estimates of 
the Danish shadow economy contain the years 1995 with 3.1%, up to 2001 with 3.8%. See also 
newer studies like Feld & Larsen (2005; 2008; 2009) which estimate similar sizes for the shadow 
economy of Germany. 
10 ) The advantages and disadvantages of this method are extensively dealt by Pedersen (2003), 
Mogensen (1985) and Mogensen et al. (1995) in their excellent and very carefully conducted 
investigations. 
11) In the United States, IRS (1979; 1983), Simon & Witte (1982), Witte (1987), Clotefelter (1983), 
and Feige (1986). For a more detailed discussion, see Dallago (1990) and Thomas (1992). 
12) See, for example, Franz (1983) for Austria; MacAfee (1980), O’Higgins (1989) and Smith (1985) 
for Great Britain; Petersen (1982) and Del Boca (1981) for Germany; Park (1979) for the United 
States. For a critical survey, see Thomas (1992). 
13) A related approach is pursued by Pissarides & Weber (1989), who use micro data from household 
budget surveys to estimate the extent of income understatement by self-employed. 
14) Such studies have been made for Italy, see for example Contini (1981) and Del Boca (1981); for 
the United States, see O’Neill (1983), for later studies, see Williams (2009; 2013), Williams & 
Lansky (2013), and Williams & Rodgers (2013), for a critical survey, see again Thomas (1992). 
15) For an extended description of this approach, see Feige (1996); for a further application for the 
Netherlands, Boeschoten & Fase (1984), and for Germany, Langfeldt (1984). 
16 ) For a detailed criticism of the transaction approach see Boeschoten & Fase (1984), Frey & 
Pommerehne (1984), Kirchgaessner (1984), Tanzi (1982a; 1982b; 1986), Dallago (1990), Thomas 
(1986; 1992; 1999) and Giles (1999a). 
17) The estimation of such a currency demand equation has been criticized by Thomas (1999) but part 
of this criticism has been considered by the work of Giles (1999a; 1999b) and Bhattacharyya 
(1999), who both use the latest econometric techniques. 
18) See Karmann (1986; 1990), Schneider (1997; 1998; 2011), Johnson et al. (1998a), Williams & 
Windebank (1995), and Schneider & Williams (2013). 
19) See Thomas (1992; 1999), Feige (1986), Pozo (1996), Pedersen (2003), Ahumada et al. (2004), and 
Schneider & Williams (2013). 
Turkish Economic Review 
 TER, 3(2), F. Schneider, p.256-280. 
274 
274 
 
20) One (weak) justification for the only use of the tax variable is that this variable has by far the 
strongest impact on the size of the shadow economy in the studies known to the authors. The only 
exception is the study by Frey & Weck-Hannemann (1984) where the variable “tax immorality” has 
a quantitatively larger and statistically stronger influence than the direct tax share in the model 
approach. In the study by Pommerehne & Schneider (1985), for the U.S., besides various tax 
measures, data for regulation, tax immorality, and minimum wage rates are available; the tax 
variable has a dominating influence and contributes roughly 60–70% to the size of the shadow 
economy. See also Zilberfarb (1986). 
21) Another study by Tanzi (1982, esp. pp. 110–113) explicitly deals with this criticism. A very careful 
investigation of the amount of US dollars used abroad and US currency used in the shadow 
economy and for “classical” crime activities has been undertaken by Rogoff (1998), who concludes 
that large denomination bills are major driving force for the growth of the shadow economy and 
classical crime activities, due largely to reduced transaction costs. 
22) However in studies for European countries Kirchgässner (1983; 1984) and Schneider (1986) 
conclude that the estimation results for Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are quite robust 
when using the currency demand method. Hill & Kabir (1996) find for Canada that the rise of the 
shadow economy varies with respect to the tax variable used; they conclude “when the theoretically 
best tax rates are selected and a range of plausible velocity values is used, this method estimates 
underground economic growth between 1964 and 1995 at between 3% and 11% of GDP.” (p.1553).  
23) This method was used earlier by Lizzeri (1979), Del Boca & Forte (1982), and then was used much 
later by Portes (1996), Kaufmann & Kaliberda (1996), Johnson et al. (1997).  For a critique see 
Lackó (1998). 
24) Johnson et al. (1997) make an attempt to adjust for changes in the elasticity of electricity/GDP. 
25) See also Aigner et al. (1988, p. 303), applying this approach for the United States over time; for 
Germany this approach has been applied by Karmann (1986; 1990). The pioneers of this approach 
are Weck (1983), Frey & Weck-Hannemann (1984), who applied this approach to cross-sectional 
data from the 24 OECD countries for various years. Before turning to this approach they developed 
the concept of “soft modeling” (Frey et al. (1982), Frey & Weck (1983a; 1983b)), an approach 
which has been used to provide a ranking of the relative size of the shadow economy in different 
countries. One paper dealing extensively with the MIMIC approach, its development and its 
weaknesses is from Del’Anno (2003) as well as the excellent study by Giles & Tedds (2002). 
26) Thomas (1992); Schneider (2003; 2005; 2011); Pozo (1996); Johnson et al. (1998a; 1998b); Giles 
(1997a; 1997b; 1999a; 1999b; 1999c); Giles & Tedds (2002), Giles et al. (2002), Del’Anno (2003) 
and Del’Anno & Schneider (2004). 
27) Estimation of a MIMIC model with a latent variable can be done by means of a computer program 
for the analysis of covariance structures, such as LISREL (Linear Structural Relations). A useful 
overview of the LISREL software package in an economics journal is Cziraky (2004). 
28) On the contrary, in an exploratory factor analysis a model is not specified in advance, i.e., beyond 
the specification of the number of latent variables (factors) and observed variables the researcher 
does not specify any structure of the model. This means that one assumes that all factors are 
correlated, all observable variables are directly influenced by all factors, and all measurement errors 
are uncorrelated with each other. In practice, however, the distinction between a confirmatory and 
an exploratory factor analysis is weaker. Facing poorly fitting models, researchers using the MIMIC 
model often modify their models in an exploratory way in order to improve the fit. Thus, most 
applications fall between the two extreme cases of exploratory (non-specified model structure) and 
confirmatory (ex-ante specified model structure) factor analysis (Long 1983, pp. 11–17). 
29)  This shortened part 3.2.6 closely follows Buehn & Schneider (2013), pp. 175–181, who use this 
approach extensively. 
30) Without loss of generality, all variables are taken as standardized deviations from their means. 
31 ) Particularly critical are the assumptions    E Var2ik i   for all k (homoscedasticity 
assumption) and  Cov , 0ik il    for all k l   (no autocorrelation in the error terms). 
Unfortunately, corrections for autocorrelated and heteroscedastic error terms have not yet received 
sufficient attention in models with unobservable variables (Bollen 1989, p. 58). An interesting 
exception is Folmer & Karmann (1992). 
32 ) See Dell’Anno & Schneider (2009) for a detailed discussion on different benchmarking 
procedures. 
33) This is not surprising as quite often the calibration start-values have been obtained using the 
currency demand approach in order to transform the relative estimates of the MIMIC approach.  
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